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PLURAL MARRIAGE:  
WHEN ONE SPOUSE IS NOT ENOUGH 
BY JOHN O. HAYWARD* 
And he [Solomon] had seven hundred wives, princesses, and three hundred 
concubines; 
-  1 KINGS 11:31 
INTRODUCTION 
Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has legalized same-sex marriage na-
tionwide,2 the only remaining marital frontier–at least for the Judeo-
Christian nations of the West–is polygamy, or “plural marriage” as it is 
known under its sanitized name.3  This Article presents a brief history of 
polygamy, reviews how the courts have responded to legal challenges to 
monogamous marriage, and examines how the rationale in Obergefell le-
galizing same-sex marriage, including its constitutional analysis, can be 
applied to plural marriage.4  It also references Brown v. Buhman, a federal 
district court case invalidating the cohabitation prong of Utah’s anti-
polygamy statute that was subsequently vacated and remanded,5 and con-
cludes with the argument that while same-sex marriage merely extended 
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 1 1 Kings 11:3 (King James). 
 2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding 5-4 that under the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution, all states must license a marriage between two people of the same sex 
and recognize such a marriage if it was lawfully licensed and performed in another state). 
 3 See generally Peter Nash Swisher, “I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives”: The Case for 
Polygamous Marriage after United States v. Windsor and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 29 
BYU J. PUB L. 299 (2015).  Of course, Islamic countries allow polygamy because the Koran 
sanctions it.  See Koran 4:1 (N.J. Dawood trans., Penguin Books 2006) (“If you fear you cannot 
treat orphans with fairness, then you may marry other women who seem good to you: two, three, 
or four of them.”).  See generally DAVID P. BARASH, OUT OF EDEN: THE SURPRISING 
CONSEQUENCES OF POLYGAMY (2016) (arguing that humans are biologically and anthropologi-
cally inclined toward polygamy). 
 4 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 5 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).  A three-judge panel unanimously ruled the case moot for 
various reasons, including the relocation of the plaintiffs to Nevada.  See Brown v. Buhman, 822 
F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016); see also infra note 17.  For a summary of the appellate court’s 
decision, see Ruthann Robson, Tenth Circuit: Utah’s Ban on Polygamous Cohabitation and 
Marriage Stands, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Apr. 12, 2016), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2016/04/tenth-circuit-ban-on-polygamous-
cohabitation-and-marriage-stands.html 
2 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 
the right to marry to homosexuals without disturbing the “status quo” of 
heterosexual marriage, plural marriage has the potential to disrupt both het-
erosexual and same-sex marriage by destroying the exclusivity of the mar-
riage bond. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLYGAMY 
Polygamy (i.e., a man being married to more than one woman at the 
same time)6 is taken for granted in the Old Testament, even though the ac-
count of creation indicates that monogamy was the original state envisaged 
by the Creator.7  Despite frequent biblical instances of polygamy,8 monog-
amy appears to have been the rule, polygamy the exception.  The Ten 
Commandments are silent about the number of wives a man may have, and 
at the time of the writing of Exodus (1450–1400 B.C.E) and Deuteronomy 
(1410–1395 B.C.E.), polygamy was well accepted and practiced by Juda-
ism and its surrounding cultures.9  The influential rabbi Gershom ben Judah 
(c. 960–1040) “put the nail in the polygamy coffin” with his many rules 
and laws.10  While monogamy is common in Western societies, and often 
observed more in the breach than the practice,11 polygamy is so common in 
non-Western societies that it can fairly be regarded as the norm.12 
One commentator on the history of polygamy has written that it 
. . . is as old as man himself and polygamy has existed in most of the 
world’s known cultures, including ancient China, the Incas of Peru, the Ameri-
can Navajo, and the Macedonians of Persia.  During the age of the Old Testa-
ment patriarchs, Abraham, Esau, and Jacob headed polygamous households, 
and the great kings of Israel, David and Solomon, took plural wives, with ap-
parent biblical approval.  Likewise, there was no prohibition of polygamy in 
the New Testament and it was practiced in Judea and Galilee during the minis-
try of Jesus.  Moreover, under Islamic Shari’ah law, in the past and present, a 
 
 6 If a woman has more than one husband at the same time, it is polyandry.  See MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 900 (10th ed. 2001). 
 7 Genesis 1:27 and 2:18-24 (King James); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION 305 (R.J. 
Zwi Werblosky & Geoffrey Wigoder eds., 1965). 
 8 Lamech had two wives (Genesis 4:19), and Solomon had seven hundred (1 Kings 11:3). 
 9 See DARREL RAY, SEX AND GOD: HOW RELIGION DISTORTS SEXUALITY 57 (2012). 
 10 Id. at 32. 
 11 See generally DAVID P. BARASH & JUDITH EVE LIPTON, THE MYTH OF MONOGAMY: FIDELITY 
AND INFIDELITY IN ANIMALS AND PEOPLE (2001) (examining the regularity of polygamy in both 
animal and human relationships from a scientific perspective); see also NENA O’NEIL & GEORGE 
O’NEIL, OPEN MARRIAGE: A NEW LIFE STYLE FOR COUPLES (1972) (suggesting spouses take a 
fresh look at sexual fidelity).  On the potent combination of sex and religion, see generally 
GEOFFREY PARRINDER, SEXUAL MORALITY IN THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS (1996), which explores 
these topics within the historical and contemporary context of each of the world’s major living 
religions, including the influences of medicine, psychology, and women’s rights. 
 12 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 69 (1992) (noting that polyandry—women with mul-
tiple husbands—is “extremely rare”). 
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man may have up to four wives so long as he can adequately provide for them 
and treat them justly. 
Martin Luther, while not endorsing polygamy as an ideal practice, never-
theless observed that polygamy does not contradict Scripture and so cannot be 
prohibited by Christianity.  It was not until the Council of Trent in 1563, that 
the Roman Catholic Church finally prohibited the practice of polygamous mar-
riage.  At this time, monogamous marriage, according to one commentator, 
“became coextensive with religious devotion”: 
[A]dultery, fornication, and concubinage were deemed “sinful” and out-
lawed. . . .  In time, the Church came to exercise exclusive temporal power over 
matrimonial matters, establishing monogamy as the only legitimate marital 
form in Western Europe.  Simultaneously, polygamy came to be identified in 
Christian ethnocentric thought with the Moslem infidels and the heathens in 
“uncivilized” lands, an attitude which has survived well into the twentieth [and 
twenty-first] century.13 
The writer continues: 
While polygamy is illegal in the United States, forms of it are still prac-
ticed either overtly, pursuant to religious traditions, or covertly, by the mainte-
nance of two or more family units.  Historically, the prosecution of polygamists 
has been rare in the United States, and a growing tolerance has been shown to-
wards them . . . .  It has been estimated that as many as 60,000 individuals prac-
tice polygamy in the United States.14 
Critics of polygamy usually raise arguments against it, to wit: underage 
marriage, child abuse, incest, subjugation of women, and welfare fraud.15  
However, advocates point to the Qur’an (4:1), which, like the Old Testa-
ment, authorizes a man to have more than one wife at the same time.  Fur-
thermore, they argue that polygamy is allowed when the wife can’t have 
children or is ill, thus permitting the husband to have children without 
abandoning his first wife or not providing for her adequately.  Polygamy 
advocates also believe that it helps prevent immorality, i.e., prostitution, 
rape, fornication, adultery, and cuts down on the high divorce rate found in 
many Western monogamous societies.  Finally, they maintain that it pro-
tects widows and orphans by dealing with the issue of women outnumber-
ing men in time of war or other disasters.16 
Whatever the merits or demerits of polygamy, since 1878 when the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. United States,17 bigamy, the prac-
 
 13 Swisher, supra note 3, at 301 (footnotes omitted). 
 14 Id. at 308 (quoting Michèle Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy: A Case for Expanding 
the American Concept of Surviving Spouse So As to Include De Facto Polygamous Spouses, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2007)). 
 15 Id. (citing Alyssa Rower, The Legality of Polygamy: Using the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 38 FAM L.Q. 711, 715-17 (2004)(applying the “liberty interest” of Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) as a rationale for legalizing polygamy). 
 16 Id. at 309 (citing HODKINSON, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 107-08 (1984)). 
 17 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  For a recent judicial critique of Reynolds, see Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1188-90 (D. Utah 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (criticizing the reason-
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tice of having more than one spouse at the same time, has been illegal in 
the U.S.  It is to this decision we now turn. 
II. PLURAL MARRIAGE IN THE COURTS18 
George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints (Mormons), was arrested and charged with polygamy, which 
violated the territorial law of Utah.19  Among Reynolds’s defenses was the 
claim that he was acting in accordance with the dictates of his religion and 
the territorial law infringed upon his free exercise rights.20 
The Court noted that “religion” is not defined anywhere in the U.S. 
Constitution, and so it must inquire into “the history of the times in the 
midst of which the provision [the First Amendment] was adopted.”21  In the 
opinion, the court reviewed the development of the Amendment and con-
cluded by citing Thomas Jefferson’s well-known letter to the Danbury Bap-
tist Association in 1802: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; 
that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opin-
ions,—I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building 
a wall of separation between church and State. 22 
Since this emanated from the “acknowledged leader of the advocates of 
the measure,” the Justices accepted it as authoritative, and concluded that 
“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was 
 
ing in the case but noting that “the Supreme Court has periodically continued to cite Reynolds in 
Free Exercise cases” and admitting that the case is “binding on the limited question of any poten-
tial free exercise right to the actual practice of polygamy”).  On the moral and legal aspects of 
polygamy, see Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Re-
ligion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Ju-
risprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 239-45, 253 (2001) (arguing that courts have 
done an “unsatisfactory job” of establishing that the state has a compelling interest in limiting 
plural marriage and should move away from moralistic arguments toward arguments about pro-
tecting women and children). 
 18     This section originally appeared in 53 J. OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES 219-223 (2014). 
 19 He was sentenced to two years at hard labor and ordered to pay a fine of $500.  See Reynolds, 98 
U.S. at 150-51. 
 20 He argued before the district court “that it was the duty of male members of said church, circum-
stances permitting, to practise polygamy; . . . that this duty was enjoined by different books 
which the members of said church believed to be of divine origin, and among others the Holy 
Bible, and also that the members of the church believed that the practice of polygamy was direct-
ly enjoined upon the male members thereof by the Almighty God, in a revelation to Joseph 
Smith, the founder and prophet of said church; that the failing or refusing to practise polygamy 
by such male members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and 
that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.”  Id. at 161. 
 21 Id. at 162. 
 22 Id. at 164. 
Jan. 2017] PLURAL MARRIAGE 5 
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order.”23 
The Court declared that “[p]olygamy has always been odious among 
the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of 
the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic 
and of African people.”24  The Court then briefly discussed in the opinion 
the substantial legal precedent that criminalizes polygamy, declaring that 
. . .it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the Un-
ion when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the 
civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.  In the face of all this ev-
idence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious 
freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important 
feature of social life.25 
The Court stated that given the legislature’s authority to outlaw polyg-
amy, then 
. . .the only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a 
part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute.  If they are, 
then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be 
found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go 
free.26 
Remarking that this would introduce a new element into criminal law, 
the Justices declared that while the law may not interfere with religious be-
liefs or opinions, it may prohibit actions, using as dramatic examples a reli-
gious practice that required human sacrifice27 or a widow burning herself 
upon her husband’s funeral pyre.28  In any event, the Court announced it 
could not be seriously argued that the free exercise of religion allowed such 
practices,29 otherwise: 
To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief su-
perior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a 
law unto himself.  Government could exist only in name under such circum-
stances.30 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 165. 
 26 Id. at 166. 
 27 Id.  Perhaps the Court had in mind worship of the god Baal, whose followers practiced human 
sacrifice.  See Werblosky & Wigoder, supra note 7, at 53. 
 28 The Court was referring to the now-outlawed Hindu practice of suttee that was common in India 
for many years.  See generally EDWARD THOMPSON, SUTTEE: A HISTORICAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE HINDU RITE OF WIDOW-BURNING (1928). 
 29 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
 30 Id. at 167.  Justice Scalia would cite this very phrase 112 years later in Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), upholding a state statute criminalizing the use of peyote against 
a free exercise of religion challenge brought by Native Americans who used it as a sacrament in 
their religious practices. 
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The Free Exercise Clause was again unsuccessful as a defense to polyg-
amy in Davis v. Beason,31 where the Supreme Court remarked that: 
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian 
countries.  They are crimes by the laws of the United States, and they are 
crimes by the laws of Idaho.  They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage re-
lation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman and to debase man.  
Few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society and receive 
more general or more deserved punishment.  To extend exemption from pun-
ishment for such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the commu-
nity.  To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense 
of mankind.32 
Commenting on the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court de-
clared that “[i]t was never intended or supposed that the [A]mendment 
could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of 
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society.”33  As in 
Reynolds, the Court paraded out an assortment of heinous practices that 
would not be tolerated under the Free Exercise Clause:  human sacrifice, 
“promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by the passions of its 
members,” and the abolition of marriage.34  Finally, laying to rest any no-
tion that religion can take precedence over the criminal law, the Justices 
emphasized that: 
[N]ever before in the history of this country has it been seriously contended 
that the whole punitive power of the government for acts, recognized by the 
general consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper matters for 
prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious 
sect encouraging crime may be carried out without hindrance.35 
 Thus, as the nation entered the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
made it apparent that religious practices “inimical to the peace, good 
order and morals of society”36 would not be sanctioned by cloaking 
them with the mantle of religious practice or custom.  However, both 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries saw petitioners before the Court 
challenging the “peace, good order and morals of society”37 by wanting 
to marry individuals of different races38 or of the same gender.39  In 
both instances, the Court obliged.  Now advocates of plural marriage 
 
 31 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
 32 Id. at 341-42. 
 33 Id. at 342. 
 34 Id. at 343.  Perhaps the Court had in mind the “Free Love” movement of the late nineteenth cen-
tury, which sought to remove the state from matters of marriage, birth control, and adultery.  See 
generally JOHN C. SPURLOCK, FREE LOVE, MARRIAGE AND MIDDLE-CLASS RADICALISM IN 
AMERICA (1988). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state laws prohibiting interracial marriage on 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process grounds). 
 39 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). 
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seek to use the rationale of these decisions to invalidate bigamy laws 
and allow individuals to have multiple spouses at the same time.  Let us 
now examine these arguments and determine whether they are persua-
sive. 
III. CAN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE JUSTIFY PLURAL MARRIAGE? 
In his dissent in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts opined that the argu-
ments supporting same sex marriage could be used with equal force to jus-
tify plural marriage.40  During the Obergefell oral argument, some Justices 
raised the same issue.  One observer documented the exchange: 
While issues related to polygamous marriages or polyamorous relation-
ships appear only in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell, it was of con-
cern to Justice Alito throughout the oral arguments in the case.  In fact, in re-
viewing the transcript of the oral arguments, it appears that concern about the 
possible recognition of polygamous marriage dominated Justice Alito’s ques-
tioning. 
Throughout the oral argument in Obergefell, Justice Alito returned to the 
issue of the implications inherent in the Obergefell arguments for the future 
recognition of polygamous or polyamorous relationships.  Justice Alito en-
gaged in several exchanges with Mary Bonauto, arguing on behalf of the same-
sex couples seeking recognition of their marriages, asking her at one point:  
“Suppose we rule in your favor in this case and then, after that, a group consist-
ing of two men and two women apply for a marriage license.  Would there be 
any ground for denying them?”  While Bonauto argued that this would not be 
the result required by the recognition of same-sex marriage, Justice Alito 
pushed further, asking: 
Well, what if there’s no—these are 4 people, 2 men and 2 women, it’s 
not—it’s not the sort of polygamous relationship, polygamous marriages that 
existed in other societies and still exist in some societies today.  And let’s say 
they’re all consenting adults, highly educated.  They’re all lawyers.  (Laughter.)  
What would be the ground under—under the logic of the decision you would 
like us to hand down in this case?  What would be the logic of denying them 
the same right? 
As John Bursch argued on behalf of the states against the recognition of 
same-sex marriage, Justice Alito again returned to the issue of polygamy in the 
following exchange: 
Justice Alito: [T]he reason for marriage is to provide a lasting bond between 
people who love each other and make a commitment to take care of each other, 
I’m not—do you see a way in which that logic can be limited to two people 
who want to have sexual relations— 
Mr. Bursch: It—it—can’t be. 
 
 40 Id. at 2621-22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Justice Alito:  [W]hy that would not extend to larger groups, the one I men-
tioned earlier, two men and two women, or why it would not extend to unmar-
ried siblings who have the same sort of relationship?41 
Clearly some Justices were concerned that sanctioning same-sex unions 
would open the door to plural marriage.  It is not surprising that counsel for 
the same-sex unions would disavow its impact on plural unions, since ad-
vocates for a cause usually are concerned only with achieving their objec-
tive and could care less about any societal reverberations. 
Next, let us examine the Obergefell rationale for same-sex unions and 
see if and how it would apply to plural marriage. 
Basing its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Obergefell ma-
jority reasoned as follows: 
The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.  
Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person 
so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.  History and tradi-
tion guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.  When 
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a 
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.42 
The Court then enumerated four principles and traditions that demon-
strate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply 
with equal force to same-sex couples: first, that “[t]he right to personal 
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autono-
my”; second, that “[t]he right to marry is fundamental because it supports a 
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed indi-
viduals”; third, that this right “safeguards children and families and thus 
draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and educa-
tion.”43  Finally, the majority concluded that marriage being important to 
the nation’s social order, in this regard same-sex marriage is no different 
than traditional marriage and so it would be demeaning to same-sex cou-
ples to prohibit them from marrying.44 
Applying these principles to plural marriage, it can be argued that: 
(1) Plural marriage, like same-sex marriage, is encompassed in the right to per-
sonal choice inherent in the concept of individual autonomy; 
(2) The right to marry is fundamental but nowhere is it required that it be lim-
ited to two people, just as it is nowhere written that it be limited to individuals 
of the opposite sex; 
 
 41 Jack Harrison, On Marriage And Polygamy, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 140-41 (2015). 
 42 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589 (citations omitted). 
 43 The court noted that precedent protects the right of married couples not to procreate so the right 
to marry cannot be conditioned on the ability to procreate.  Id. 
 44 Id. at 2599. 
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(3) Just as prohibiting same-sex marriages would harm and humiliate the chil-
dren of such unions, so would prohibiting plural marriages harm and humiliate 
the offspring of such unions, who most likely would be more numerous; 
(4) Just as it would be demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central in-
stitution of our nation’s society, it would be just as debasing to bar polygamous 
couples from this institution. 
These arguments do not address the issue of whether prohibiting plural 
marriage is a denial of Equal Protection and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process rights, perhaps the crux of the Obergefell case, which many legal 
commentators argue is the case.45 
Furthermore, let’s review Justice Roberts’s assertion that the arguments 
advanced by the majority in Obergefell apply equally to plural marriage.46  
To quote: 
One immediate question invited by the majority’s position is whether 
States may retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people.  Although 
the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, it offers no 
reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage may 
be preserved while the man-woman element may not.  Indeed, from the stand-
point of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex 
marriage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, 
which have deep roots in some cultures around the world.  If the majority is 
willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter 
one.47 
It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal 
force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage.  If “[t]here is digni-
ty in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their 
autonomy to make such profound choices,” why would there be any less digni-
ty in the bond between three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to 
make the profound choice to marry?  If a same-sex couple has the constitution-
al right to marry because their children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of 
knowing their families are somehow lesser,” why wouldn’t the same reasoning 
apply to a family of three or more persons raising children?  If not having the 
opportunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian 
couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” serve to disre-
spect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relation-
ships?48 
 
 45 See e.g., Ronald C. Otter, Three May Not Be A Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to 
Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 1998, 2014 (2015)(arguing that the focus on same-sex 
marriage in the Marriage Equality Movement has come at the expense of other forms of marriage 
that may be equally worthwhile); Swisher, supra note 13 (arguing that recent Supreme Court 
cases give proponents of polygamous marriage a strong case for validating polygamous mar-
riage); Rower, supra note 15 (applying the “liberty interest” of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) as a rationale for legalizing polygamy). 
 46 See supra note 2. 
 47 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2589 (2015) (citation omitted). 
 48 Id. at 2599 (internal citations omitted). 
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The Chief Justice cited Brown v. Buhman49 where, in a lengthy ninety-
one page opinion, a federal district court ruled that the cohabitation prong 
of Utah anti-polygamy law violated the religious, free speech, and due pro-
cess rights of the plaintiff,50 who while holding one marriage license to one 
woman, said he was “spiritually married” to three other women.51  Alt-
hough the media sensationalized the case, in today’s moral climate individ-
uals are seldom prosecuted for cohabitation, even in the Bible belt state of 
Mississippi.52  Interestingly enough, while invalidating the cohabitation 
prong of the statute, the district court did not disturb the requirement that 
an individual hold one marriage license at a time, thus not challenging 
Reynolds, though expressing doubts about its continuing viability in light of 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and whether the “social harm” Reyn-
olds sought to prevent still existed.  To quote: 
But what exactly was the “social harm” identified by the Reynolds Court in 
the Mormon practice of polygamy that made the practice “subversive of good 
order”?  Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western na-
tions of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was al-
most exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.  [T]his 
expression of the social harm identified in the Mormon practice of polygamy 
aptly exemplifies the concept.  A decade later, the Supreme Court clarified the 
social harm further, explaining that Mormons were degrading the morals of the 
country through their religious practices, such as polygamy, which, the Su-
preme Court declared, constituted “a return to barbarism” and were “contrary to 
the spirit of Christianity.”53 
Apparently the Court does not recognize any “social harms” from po-
lygamy.  However, one observer has recounted harms to women, children, 
and society.  To wit: 
WOMEN: Women in polygamous relationships are at an elevated risk of physical 
and psychological harm.  They face higher rates of domestic violence and 
abuse, including sexual abuse.  They have higher rates of depressive disorders, 
give birth to more children, and are more likely to die in childbirth and live 
shorter lives than their monogamous counterparts, in addition to having less au-
tonomy, higher rates of marital dissatisfaction and lower levels of self-esteem. 
CHILDREN: Children in polygamous families face higher infant mortality, tend 
to suffer more emotional, behavioural and physical problems, and have lower 
educational achievement than children in monogamous families.  This most 
 
 49 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). The decision has been vacated and remanded. See supra 
note 4.  The plaintiff was the subject of the TLC reality series Sister Wives.  See Dustin Siggns, 
Federal Judge Declares Utah Polygamy Law Unconstitutional, LIFESITE NEWS (Aug. 29, 2014), 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/federal-judge-declares-utah-polygamy-law-unconstitutional. 
 50 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-22. 
 51 Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 52 See M. Devin Whitt, “Shackin’ Up and the Legal Effects of Cohabitation in Mississippi” 
MISSISSIPPI FAMILY LAWYER BLOG (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.mississippifamilylawyerblog.com/2014/07/shackin-up-the-legal-effects-o.html. 
 53 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1186-87 (citations omitted) (cited in Harrison, supra note 38, at 150.) 
Jan. 2017] PLURAL MARRIAGE 11 
likely results from increased conflict, emotional stress and tension in polyga-
mous families.  Rivalry among co-wives can cause significant emotional prob-
lems for their children as well as the inability of fathers to give sufficient affec-
tion and disciplinary attention to all of their children, who are at enhanced risk 
of psychological and physical abuse and neglect.  Early marriage for girls is 
common, with resultant early sexual activity, pregnancies and childbirth having 
negative health implications for them. 
SOCIETY: Polygamy has negative impacts on society flowing from the high fer-
tility rates, large family size and poverty associated with the practice.  It gener-
ates a class of largely poor, unmarried men who are statistically predisposed to 
violence and other anti-social behaviour.  It also institutionalizes gender ine-
quality.  Patriarchal hierarchy and authoritarian control are common features of 
polygamous communities whose individuals tend to have fewer civil liberties 
than their counterparts in societies that prohibit the practice.  Furthermore, po-
lygamy’s harm to society are not specific to any particular religious, cultural or 
regional context.54 
Thus while the Obergefell Court opined that no harm could result from 
allowing same-sex couples to marry,55 plural marriage does pose substan-
tial harm to society. 
CONCLUSION 
While public opinion has gradually accepted same-sex marriage,56 only 
16% of the American public believe plural marriage is acceptable.57  This 
overwhelming majority will not stand by quietly as the un-elected and un-
accountable judiciary reformulates the centuries old institution of marriage 
to suit their political taste.  Although same-sex marriage does not impinge 
on traditional marriage, plural marriage threatens every existing marriage, 
including same-sex marriage, by destroying the exclusivity of the marriage 
bond.  Eventually society will be confronted with demands for group mar-
riage (or “polyamorous” marriage as its advocates euphemistically refer to 
it) and be forced to address the constitutional questions it poses.58  While 
our social engineers in the judiciary causally redefine civilization’s oldest 
institution, let’s hope there won’t be hell to pay. 
 
 54 Harrison, supra note 38, at 115, n.242 (citing Jonathan Turley, The Loadstone Rock:  The Role of 
Harm in the Criminalization of Plural Unions, 64 EMORY L.J. 1905, 1916-17 (2015)). 
 55 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606-07 (2015). 
 56 Otter, supra note 41, at 1987, n.25 (citing Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches 
New High at 55%, GALLUP (May 21, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-
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 57 Frank Newport, Americans Continue to Shift Left on Key Moral Issues (citing Gallup Poll May 
6–10 Values & Belief Survey, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/183413/americans-
continue-shift-left-key-moral-issues.aspx). 
 58 See generally Hadar Aviram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of Polyamorous Mar-
riage: Lessens from The Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 269 (2015) (ana-
lyzing the implications of the same-sex marriage movement on attempts to legalize polygamy). 
